Incorrect. The defendant’s conduct is dishonest if ordinary and honest people, knowing or believing the circumstances to be as the defendant knew or believed, would consider it dishonest: Ivey v Genting Casinos.

Incorrect. Consent to take the risk of harm is valid: R v Slingsby.

Incorrect. It does not matter that no life was actually endangered: R v Parker.

Incorrect. Lacey would need to think it was virtually certain that Eric would die, to have oblique intent to kill him: R v Woollin. She only thinks it is very likely, which is insufficient.

Incorrect. In medical cases, the courts usually view the cessation of treatment as an omission even when it involves positive acts (such as unplugging a life support machine): Airedale National Health Service Trust v Bland.

Incorrect. It is not relevant how the victim actually interpreted the threat so long as the defendant intended the relevant effect: R v Cakmak.

Incorrect. The meaning of a ‘position’ is unclear. It almost certainly includes all fiduciary duties (such as trustees and companies directors), but also appears to go beyond this. The government, when passing the law, suggested that it might also apply where the defendant is given access to the victim’s property, for example. It appears that it also enough that the defendant has taken responsibility for collecting and distributing wages, even where a fiduciary duty does not exist: R v Valujes.

Incorrect. The defendant can appropriate property even if he simultaneously becomes its sole and indefeasible owner: R v Hinks.

Incorrect. The aggravated offence does not apply if the defendant embarks on the burglary without a weapon but arms himself with something nearby on encountering the victim: Ohlson v Hylton. However, if he arms himself in the building before encountering the victim, this can constitute aggravated burglary: R v O’Leary.

Incorrect. A demand is unwarranted unless the defendant believes that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand and believes that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand: Theft Act 1968, s 21(1). This is a subjective test, so there is no need for the demand or use of menaces to be objectively reasonable: R v Harvey.

Incorrect. See R v Malcherek and Steel.

Incorrect. A person possesses an article if they can access and control it, even if another person physically holds the item: R v Montague.

Incorrect. The term 'disease of the mind' refers to internally caused issues only. External triggers are more properly the remit of the defence of automatism.

Incorrect. If the defendant has made a true representation which, due to changing circumstances, later becomes false, he does not commit fraud by false representation if he does not correct himself: Government of the United Arab Emirates v Allen.

Incorrect. The jury cannot take into account anything the defendant did not know. For this reason, it is not enough that the situation was ambiguous in a way which would have led a reasonable person to investigate further to rule out the possibility of death: R v Rudling.

Incorrect. Unlawful act manslaughter can only be committed by acts (not omissions) and there is no separate mens rea apart from the underlying unlawful act: DPP v Newbury; R v Lowe.

Incorrect. Knowledge is true belief, and Harold was incorrect about the contents of the package. He therefore did not know there were drugs inside.

Incorrect. A defendant may not rely on self-defence where they deliberately provoked the victim's attack as an excuse: R v Mason. A person who starts a fight is still entitled to defend themselves if the victim goes beyond self-defence and escalates the fight (for example by using a weapon), so long as the defendant did not provoke with intent to escalate the violence using self-defence as an excuse: R v Rashford.

Incorrect. It is relevant to whether force was reasonable and necessary that the defendant could have retreated, but he is not under a formal duty to retreat: Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s 76(6A).

Incorrect. The defendant cannot rely on a qualifying trigger if he incited the relevant circumstances as an excuse to be violent: Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 55(6).

Incorrect. Necessity is not available where the defendant has a choice of viable victims, something known as the 'selection' problem: Re A (Conjoined Twins). In this case, Lucy could have achieved the desired result by killing Theo, killing Marius, or jumping off herself, so there is a selection problem.

Incorrect. Alcohol or drugs may cause a person to lose capacity, even if they are not yet unconscious. However, this will not automatically be the case – it depends on the degree of intoxication and whether it prevents the victim from understanding relevant information and weighing it up: R v Bree.

Incorrect. See R v Brown and Stratton.

Incorrect. Firstly, the defendant must intend to destroy or damage property or be subjectively reckless as to whether the property would be damaged or destroyed: Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 1(1). Secondly, the defendant must know that the property belongs to another or be recklessness as to whether it belongs to another: R v Smith.

Incorrect. See R v Alliston.

Incorrect. The exclusion for sexual infidelity triggers only applies if sexual infidelity is the only trigger, and not mixed in with other triggers: R v Clinton.

Incorrect. The defendant must have had a 'guilty mind' at the time the actus reus was being carried out: Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority v First-tier Tribunal.

Incorrect. Grievous bodily harm is defined as ‘very serious harm’ and given its ordinary meaning: R v Metheran.

Incorrect. Liability is strict – it does not even matter that the defendant (reasonably or otherwise) believed that the complainant was over 13: R v G. Children under 13 cannot consent.

Incorrect. The defendant must interact with the property at some point, whether by physically touching it or controlling the account in which money is contained. Causing the victim to transfer property to a third-party themselves is not appropriation: R v Briggs.

Incorrect. If the defendant purchased the property in good faith, section 3(2) of the Theft Act 1968 provides that later assumption of ownership rights which that person believes themselves to have shall not be treated as theft just because the person transferring the property did not have good title to the property.

Incorrect. See the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s 76(5).

Incorrect. Hyperglycaemia is an internal cause of involuntary action, and so the appropriate defence is automatism.

Incorrect. The goods cease to be stolen once they have been returned to the victim or the victim has lost any right to claim the goods in restitution law. The same act of stealing goods cannot be relied on as an act of handling stolen goods.

Incorrect. If the victim writes out a cheque for the defendant in exchange for valuable consideration, the defendant acquire two pieces of property – physical property in the paper and a chose in action (the right to sue the victim’s bank). However, the chose in action never belonged to anyone else because it vested in the defendant the moment it came into being - the defendant therefore does not acquire property belonging to another. As for the paper, cheques are returned to the victim once presented for payment. This means that normally the defendant will lack intention to deprive the victim of the physical piece of paper and so cannot be convicted of stealing that either: R v Clark.

Incorrect. See DPP v Majewski.

Incorrect. It is not clear whether a pure opinion (one not based on facts at all) can be a false representation, though under the old law it could not be: R v Bryan.

Incorrect. Whether a normal person might have acted in a similar way to the defendant is assessed objectively. The normal person is given the defendant’s sex and age, along with any other characteristics which are relevant for reasons other than bearing on capacity for self-control.

Incorrect. Damaging property as an act of political protest is not a lawful excuse: R v Pritchard.

Incorrect. Damaging property to prevent the government from acting in breach of international law is not a lawful excuse: R v Pritchard.