Incorrect. The bicycle is now a representative object: see Theft Act 1968, s 24(2)(a).

Incorrect. There is no need to show he had a specific fraud in mind: R v Sakalauskas.

Incorrect. A person possesses an article if they can access and control it, even if another person physically holds the item: R v Montague.

Incorrect. Firstly, the defendant must intend to destroy or damage property or be subjectively reckless as to whether the property would be damaged or destroyed: Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 1(1). Secondly, the defendant must know that the property belongs to another or be recklessness as to whether it belongs to another: R v Smith.

Incorrect. If the defendant believes the statement to be false but it is in fact true, he may still be convicted of attempted fraud: R v Cornelius.

Incorrect. As long as another person also has a property interest in the object, the defendant can commit theft with respect to it.

Incorrect. If the defendant has made a true representation which, due to changing circumstances, later becomes false, he does not commit fraud by false representation if he does not correct himself: Government of the United Arab Emirates v Allen.

Incorrect. Damaging property to prevent the government from acting in breach of international law is not a lawful excuse: R v Pritchard.

Incorrect. If a building is usually lived in, it can remain a dwelling even though no one is presently living in it: Hudson v CPS.

Incorrect. The defendant must also intend to enter the building, knowing or being reckless as to the facts which make him a trespasser: R v Collins.

Incorrect. The defendant must interact with the property at some point, whether by physically touching it or controlling the account in which money is contained. Causing the victim to transfer property to a third-party themselves is not appropriation: R v Briggs.

Incorrect. The defendant’s conduct is dishonest if ordinary and honest people, knowing or believing the circumstances to be as the defendant knew or believed, would consider it dishonest: Ivey v Genting Casinos.

Incorrect. It is not clear whether a pure opinion (one not based on facts at all) can be a false representation, though under the old law it could not be: R v Bryan.

Incorrect. It is not necessary that the article only has illegal uses: R v Nimley.

Incorrect. Under the old common law version of this offence, if a tool held by the defendant enters the building, this could suffice as an ‘entry’. However, it would not be enough if the only reason it entered the building is because it was being used to secure entry: R v Horncastle. It is not clear if these principles apply to statutory burglary as there has not been a case on the point.

Incorrect. The classes of people who can give valid permission to enter a building extends to people who live in the house who are not the occupier or owner: R v Collins.

Incorrect. See the Theft Act 1968, s 10.

Incorrect. Appropriation is any assumption of the rights of an owner, including keeping or dealing with the property where the defendant initially acquired the property without stealing it: Theft Act 1968, s 3(1).

Incorrect. It is enough that the victim apprehends that force may be used on him, even if there is technically not an assault: R v Tennant.

Incorrect. An appropriation can occur even where the defendant has the owner’s consent to do the act: R v Gomez.

Incorrect. Gain and loss in the context of blackmail refers to economic and proprietary gains and losses only: Theft Act 1968, s 34(2)(a).

Incorrect. The aggravated offence does not apply if the defendant embarks on the burglary without a weapon but arms himself with something nearby on encountering the victim: Ohlson v Hylton.

Incorrect. Where the defendant intends to return the property, he may still be treated as having intention to permanently deprive the other person if he intends ‘to treat the thing as his own to dispose of regardless of the other’s rights’ by taking to for such a period and in such circumstances that it is ‘equivalent to an outright taking or disposal’: Theft Act 1968, s 6(1).

Incorrect. It is not relevant how the victim actually interpreted the threat so long as the defendant intended the relevant effect: R v Cakmak.

Incorrect. Unlike the basic criminal damage offence, the defendant does not have a lawful excuse merely because he believes he has consent or was acting to protect property: Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 5(1).

Incorrect. The victim possesses property if they have a significant degree of control and intend to possess the property. This can be broad, such as an intention to possess everything on the victim’s land: R v Woodman.

Incorrect. If the victim writes out a cheque for the defendant in exchange for valuable consideration, the defendant acquire two pieces of property – physical property in the paper and a chose in action (the right to sue the victim’s bank). However, the chose in action never belonged to anyone else because it vested in the defendant the moment it came into being - the defendant therefore does not acquire property belonging to another. As for the paper, cheques are returned to the victim once presented for payment. This means that normally the defendant will lack intention to deprive the victim of the physical piece of paper and so cannot be convicted of stealing that either: R v Clark.

Incorrect. A representation is false if it is untrue or misleading and the defendant knows it is, or might be, untrue or misleading: Fraud Act 2006, s 2(2).

Incorrect. The defendant enters the building if any part of him enters, no matter how small or slightly: R v Davis. This is true even if the defendant has not entered sufficiently far to be capable of committing theft or any of the other relevant offences: R v Ryan.

Incorrect. Merely borrowing property is not theft because the defendant intends to return the property rather than permanently deprive the other person of it.

Incorrect. The defendant can appropriate property even if he simultaneously becomes its sole and indefeasible owner: R v Hinks.

Incorrect. Goods cease to be stolen when they are purchased by a third-party in good faith. The sale to Ricky meant the goods ceased to be stolen, so Julie has not handled stolen goods.

Incorrect. ‘Menace’ has a broad meaning, going beyond threats of violence to persons or property. It includes any action which an ordinary person of normal stability might find detrimental (such as the publication of damaging information) or which the defendant knows the victim in particular will find detrimental: Thorne v Motor Trade Association. It does not matter that the defendant cannot carry out the threat: R v Lambert.

Incorrect. If the defendant purchased the property in good faith, section 3(2) of the Theft Act 1968 provides that later assumption of ownership rights which that person believes themselves to have shall not be treated as theft just because the person transferring the property did not have good title to the property.

Incorrect. It does not matter that no life was actually endangered: R v Parker.

Incorrect. The defendant must intend to endanger life by damaging property – it is insufficient that he intends to harm someone and incidentally damages property in the process: R v Steer.

Incorrect. Where the defendant intends to return the property, he may still be treated as having intention to permanently deprive the other person if he parts with the property (without authority) to a third party, wherein it will only be returned to the defendant if he performs a condition he may not be able to perform: Theft Act 1968, s 6(2).

Incorrect. A demand is unwarranted unless the defendant believes that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand and believes that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand: Theft Act 1968, s 21(1). This is a subjective test, so there is no need for the demand or use of menaces to be objectively reasonable: R v Harvey.

Incorrect. There is no requirement that anyone actually be deceived by or act on the representation: Proctor v The Chief Constable of Cleveland Police.

Incorrect. The goods cease to be stolen once they have been returned to the victim or the victim has lost any right to claim the goods in restitution law. The same act of stealing goods cannot be relied on as an act of handling stolen goods.

Incorrect. Damaging property as an act of political protest is not a lawful excuse: R v Pritchard.

Incorrect. The defendant commits fraud by failure to disclose if they dishonestly fail to disclose information to another person when they are under a legal duty, intending by this to make a gain for himself or another, or to cause another a loss, or to expose another to the risk of loss: Fraud Act 2006, s 3(1).

Incorrect. It is not clear whether the representation is made if it is not successfully communicated to anyone, such as where an email is sent but never read or a letter is posted but never arrives.

Incorrect. Knowledge requires subjective true belief, and it is not enough that a reasonable person would have known the representation is false: R v Augunas.

Incorrect. The aggravated offence does not apply if the defendant embarks on the burglary without a weapon but arms himself with something nearby on encountering the victim: Ohlson v Hylton. However, if he arms himself in the building before encountering the victim, this can constitute aggravated burglary: R v O’Leary.

Incorrect. The meaning of a ‘position’ is unclear. It almost certainly includes all fiduciary duties (such as trustees and companies directors), but also appears to go beyond this. The government, when passing the law, suggested that it might also apply where the defendant is given access to the victim’s property, for example. It appears that it also enough that the defendant has taken responsibility for collecting and distributing wages, even where a fiduciary duty does not exist: R v Valujes.

Incorrect. There is no requirement that the victim loses anything: Chan Man-sin v Attorney General of Hong Kong.